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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, most OECD countries have lowered their corporate statutory tax
rates. An important yet open question is who benets from corporate tax cuts. While the
methodology for assigning the burden of changes in the personal income tax is straightforward
 the individual who actually pays the tax is typically assumed to bear the burden of
the tax  assigning the burden of the corporate income tax has proven to be a di¢ cult
and controversial undertaking. In the United States, the government agencies that produce
distributional analyses of tax reforms use di¤erent assumptions when it comes to distributing
the burden of the corporate income tax. The sta¤ of the Joint Committee on Taxation
does not distribute the corporate income tax citing uncertainty over who actually bears the
burden of the tax. At the same time, the published estimates of the Congressional Budget
O¢ ce and U.S. Treasury Department assign the entire burden of the corporate tax to capital
owners in proportion to their share of aggregate capital income. This incidence assumption
is consistent with the results from the seminal study of Harberger (1962).
As is well-known, the Harberger study assumed a closed-economy, xed factors of produc-
tion, perfect competition, and full factor mobility across sectors. Since Harbergers original
analysis, public nance economists have considered how relaxing di¤erent assumptions of
the model will change his nding that the corporate tax is likely borne by all owners of cap-
ital.1 For example, once we allow for an open economy with international capital mobility,
domestic owners of capital may be able to escape the tax by moving capital abroad and, as
a result, domestic labor may bear a substantial burden of the corporate income tax. While
researchers have built and simulated theoretical models that relax many of assumptions of
the Harberger analysis (including Harberger (1995, 2006)), there have been relatively few
attempts to econometrically estimate who bears the burden of the corporate income tax.
A series of recent papers present estimates of the incidence of the corporate tax (see
Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2010), Desai, Foley and Hines (2007), Felix (2007)
and Hassett and Mathur (2010)). Since statutory corporate tax rates do not change often
within a country, these studies exploit cross-country variation to identify the impact of
corporate taxes on wages. These models implicitly assume that policy makers do not react
1See Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for an excellent review of extensions of the Harberger model.
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to corporate tax rate changes in the countries they compete with to attract internationally
mobile capital. However, if countries engage in tax competition then corporate tax rates
will be endogenous.2 Taking tax competition into account could lead to di¤erent conclusions
regarding the incidence of the corporate income tax. Not accounting for the endogeneity of
corporate tax rates is one weakness of the recent work. Empirical work with cross-country
data may also su¤er from omitted variable bias and measurement error (if variables used in
the analysis are not measured consistently across countries).
Researchers have also used variation in state corporate tax rates to explore the impact
of corporate taxes on wages (see Gyourko and Tracy (1989), Felix (2009), Felix and Hines
(2009), and Carroll and Prante (2010)). But these studies have the same problem described
above. If states compete over corporate tax rates, then the tax rates in the estimated
equations are endogenous responses of a tax setting game and the standard OLS estimates
will be biased and inconsistent.3 Further, the use of formulary apportionment by the states
to assess corporate tax liabilities makes it di¢ cult to measure the appropriate corporate tax
rate for multijurisdictional rms.
We take a new approach to measuring the burden of the corporate tax. We recognize that
the tax burden on a marginal investment project depends on the asset mix of the project.
Since industries use di¤erent asset mixes they will face di¤erent e¤ective marginal tax rates.
We use variation in e¤ective marginal tax rates across industries and across time in the U.S.
to estimate the incidence of the corporate income tax. This approach avoids the problems
of measurement error and omitted variable error that may plague the cross-country studies.
Further, limiting the analysis to one country removes the estimation problems associated
with tax competition that arise in the cross-country and cross-state analyses.
The extant empirical work implicitly assumes that the corporate sector is perfectly com-
petitive. But market structures vary across industries. The presence of strategic interaction
and any resulting economic rents may have implications for incidence analysis. Corporate
economic rents will arise if rms reduce output below the competitive level. As Auerbach
2The tax competition literature (see, for example, Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002), Altshuler and Grubert
(2004), Winner (2005), and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008)) has provided extensive empirical
evidence of strategic interaction among national governments over corporate tax rates.
3Recent evidence on strategic competition among the US states in tax rates includes Besley and Rosen
(1998), Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2001), Rork (2003), and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2007).
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(2006) points out, a tax in an industry with restricted output due to imperfect competition
will be more distortionary than one in a competitive industry since it will worsen the origi-
nal distortion to output. Whether tax shifting is exacerbated depends on parameters of the
economy. Our empirical approach allows us to estimate the extent to which the incidence of
the corporate tax varies across industry market structure.
We use the general equilibrium model presented in Davidson and Martin (1985) to show
that the elasticity of wages with respect to the corporate income tax rate may increase or de-
crease with the industry concentration level. We use data on individual U.S. workers matched
with industry-level e¤ective marginal tax rates and industry concentration ratios. (The in-
dustry concentration ratio proxies for the extent of imperfect competition in an industry 
the more concentrated the industry, the less competition each rm in the industry faces).
We nd a statistically signicant and negative relationship between wage rates and industry
e¤ective marginal corporate tax rates. Further, our estimates suggest that the presence and
extent of imperfect competition matters for analyzing the incidence of the corporate income
tax. A one percent increase in the concentration ratio increases the sensitivity of wages to
tax rates by 9:5 percent.
We also carry out the regression analysis at the industry level to account for the possibility
that the relationship between wages and taxes is only relevant for the marginal worker
in the labor market. Estimates from the industry-level regressions also point to industry
competitiveness playing an important role in determining the impact of the corporate income
tax on wages. Both the individual- and industry-level estimates indicate that the mean
elasticity of wages with respect to the industry marginal e¤ective corporate tax rate is
around -0.03.
We translate our estimated wage elasticity into a labor share of the corporate income
tax and nd that the burden borne by labor of a one dollar increase in the corporate tax
liability is about 60 cents. The lower bound of the labor share of the tax burden is 42 cents
in our most conservative condence interval. The estimated labor share of the tax burden
is in line with the general equilibrium simulation results in Harberger (2006) but somewhat
smaller than that in Randolph (2006).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we briey review empirical
studies of the incidence of corporate income tax. In section 3 we introduce the theoretical
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framework for the empirical work and in section 4 we describe the data and present our
econometric specication. We discuss our results and various econometric issues in section
5. In the nal section we draw conclusions from our analysis. We provide a full derivation
of our theoretical prediction as well as the industry concordance we developed to construct
the dataset in the appendix.
2 Empirical Studies of the Incidence of the
Corporate Income Tax
Several recent empirical studies have estimated the e¤ect of the corporate income tax on
wages using cross-country data.4 Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2010) consider the
possibility that corporations shift income taxes to workers through the wage bargaining
process. They measure the e¤ect of corporate income taxes paid by rms (as opposed to
corporate tax rates) on employee compensation using data on more than 500,000 rms in
nine European countries over the period 1996 to 2003. Conditional on value-added per
employee, a one dollar increase in the tax bill tends to reduce the median real wage by 49
cents. A related study by Felix and Hines (2009) using data from the year 2000 evaluates the
e¤ect of U.S. state corporate income taxes on union wages and nds that a ten percent lower
state tax rate is associated with a 3.6 percent higher union wage premium. Their results
suggest that union workers see a 54 cent decrease in wages for every one dollar increase in
the corporate tax bill. It is important to note that these studies do not measure general
equilibrium e¤ects of the corporate tax on wages but rather the impact of the tax on the
outcome of the worker and rm bargain over economic rents.
A series of studies have attempted to provide direct evidence of the general equilibrium
e¤ect of the corporate income tax on wages using cross-country data. Hassett and Mathur
(2010) nd that wages are highly responsive to changes in the corporate tax rate using
aggregate wage and tax data within the manufacturing sector for 72 countries between 1981
4See Gravelle and Hungerford (2008), Gentry (2007) and Harris (2009) for critical reviews of empirical
studies of corporate tax incidence.
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and 2002. The estimated elasticity of wages with respect to corporate income tax rates ranges
from 0:4 to 0:6 across di¤erent specications, indicating that a one dollar increase in tax
revenue leads to a three to four dollar decrease in the real wage. As Gravelle and Hungerford
(2008) point out, the large magnitude and signicance of this elasticity is sensitive to the
use of alternative exchange rates and time intervals. In addition, by including a measure of
value-added per worker as a control variable, the identied tax coe¢ cient fails to capture
the e¤ects of the corporate tax on wages through changes in value-added (Arulampalam,
Devereux and Ma¢ ni, 2010).
Felix (2007) uses aggregate data on wages of workers at di¤erent skill levels from 19
OECD countries over the period 1979 to 2000 and estimates that a one percentage point
increase in the top statutory corporate tax rate decreases annual wages by 0:7 percent. She
nds no di¤erence in the extent to which the tax is shifted to labor at di¤erent skill levels.
Desai, Foley and Hines (2007) use data from US multinational rms operating in 50 countries
between 1989 and 2004 to jointly estimate the relative share of the corporate tax borne by
labor and capital. Constraining the portion of the total tax burden borne by capital and
labor together to be one, they nd that labor bears between 45 to 75 percent of the incidence
of the corporate income tax.
While some have disputed the ndings of these studies (see, for example, Gravelle and
Hungerford (2008)), this growing body of empirical work does provide suggestive evidence
that labor bears a large burden of the corporate tax. However, as discussed in the intro-
duction, much of this work uses either cross-country or cross-state data without correcting
for the possible endogeneity of corporate tax rates due to tax competition. In addition, the
extant literature implicitly assumes that all rms operate in perfectly competitive markets.
We consider imperfect competition in the next section and estimate the impact of corporate
taxes on wages in a setting in which changes in other countries tax rates should have no
impact on our estimated coe¢ cients.
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3 Theoretical Background
Following Harberger (1962), we discuss the general equilibrium incidence e¤ects of the corpo-
rate income tax in the simplest setting: an economy with corporate and noncorporate sectors
producing separate goods with two xed factors of production, capital and labor. Both fac-
tors of production are mobile across sectors and the corporate income tax is modeled as an
additional tax on the returns to capital in the corporate sector.
A source-based tax on the return to corporate capital a¤ects the equilibrium return
to capital and labor through two channels: the output e¤ect and the factor substitution
e¤ect. The output e¤ect arises because the tax drives up the price of goods in the corporate
sector. As demand for the corporate sector good decreases in response to the price increase,
capital and labor will be released from the corporate sector. The factor substitution e¤ect
arises because in response to the tax, corporate good producers attempt to substitute labor
for capital driving down the return to capital relative to labor. How the reallocation of
capital and labor across sectors a¤ects the relative returns to factors in equilibrium depends
on the initial allocations of capital and labor in the corporate and non-corporate sectors,
the degree to which rms in the corporate and non-corporate sectors can substitute labor
for capital, and the elasticities of demand for corporate and non-corporate output. With
calibrated factor shares and input/output substitution elasticities that are reasonable for
the U.S. economy, Harberger (1962) nds that capital income bears approximately the full
burden of the corporate tax.
Further work including Mutti and Grubert (1985), Harberger (1995, 2006), Gravelle and
Smetters (2006), and Randolph (2006) examines the incidence of corporate income tax in
an open economy in which capital can move across countries in response to changes in
factor returns.5 As in the original Harberger model, the corporate sector is assumed to
be characterized by perfect competition. The conclusions of the open economy general
equilibrium models are straightforward: if it is feasible and protable for capital to avoid a
tax by shifting to other sectors (and abroad in an open economy model), then the burden will
fall primarily on labor, assuming labor is immobile. The extent to which a shift is feasible
5See Gravelle (2010) for a review of results from general equilibrium tax incidence models of the corporate
income tax.
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and protable depends on a variety of assumptions.
The assumption of perfect competition fails to characterize the structure of some U.S.
industries. Davidson and Martin (1985) (hereafter DM) capture the strategic e¤ects of
imperfect competition on tax incidence in a two-sector general equilibrium model.6 We use
their model to motivate our empirical study of the extent to which the corporate income
taxes are passed to labor through reductions in wages under imperfect competition. We leave
the full derivation of the model to the Appendix and briey discuss the economic intuition
in this section.
The economy consists of a competitive (noncorporate) and an imperfectly competitive
(corporate) sector. The corporate sector has a small number of rms. The corporate group
plays a repeated game in which each rm produces constrained quantities of a single good
under constant cost. Constrained production maximizes joint corporate prots subject to no
cheating. At a given point of time, if any rm produces higher output, every rm will revert
permanently to the lower Nash output level. Each rm therefore compares the current gain
from a higher output level to the present value of prot loss by permanently producing at a
lower output level. The present value of the prot loss due to producing at the lower level
is discounted using the return to capital.
The corporate tax has the usual output and factor substitution e¤ects. There is also
another route by which the equilibrium return to factors may be a¤ected, however. The
corporate tax decreases the net return to capital and this rate of return is used to discount
the value of the loss due to deviating from the constrained output level. A fall in the discount
rate increases the present value of the loss in prots from diverting to a higher output level.
This additional e¤ect of the corporate tax works in the same direction as the output e¤ect
magnifying the decrease in the return to labor (capital) when the corporate sector is labor
(capital) intensive. As a result, the change in relative factor prices due to the corporate tax
is larger (smaller) as the corporate sector is more capital (labor) intensive.
In the appendix, we show that the elasticity of the wage with respect to the corporate
income tax rate increases as the number of rms in the corporate sector decreases if the
corporate sector is capital intensive. The result is ambiguous if the corporate sector is labor
6See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for partial equilibrium analyses of the
incidence of corporate tax under imperfect competition.
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intensive, however. The sensitivity of wages to changes in the corporate income tax may
increase or decrease as the number of rms in an industry decreases. In the next section we
present a model that allows us to estimate the impact of the corporate income tax on wages
and test whether any impact changes with industry concentration.
4 Research Design and Data
We model the natural logarithm of weekly wages for individual i in industry j in year t, wijt,
as a function of the corporate tax rate (Tjt), the market concentration ratio (CRjt), the inter-
action between the tax rate and the concentration ratio, as well as individual characteristics
(Xij) and industry and time-specic xed e¤ects (cj and t):
lnwijt = Xij+ 1 lnTjt + 2 lnCRjt + 3(lnTjt  lnCRjt) + cj + t + "ijt. (1)
The main parameters of interest are 1 and 3. The value of 1 measures the extent to which
corporate tax e¤ects wages, while the value of 3 indicates whether industry concentration
inuences how taxes impact wages.
Our measure of the industry corporate tax is the industry-level e¤ective marginal cor-
porate tax. This summary tax measure is a function of e¤ective marginal tax rates on the
assets employed in an industry. The asset-level e¤ective marginal tax rates, discussed fur-
ther in the next section, are calculated taking statutory tax rates as well as tax incentives
such as depreciation allowances and investment tax credits into account. The statutory rate
applies to all assets and changes across our sample period. Depreciation allowances and the
investment tax credit vary both across capital asset types and across time. For each industry
and year, we calculate a weighted average e¤ective tax rate based on the asset mix in the
industry in the year being examined.
The industry-level e¤ective marginal tax rate captures how the tax incentive to invest
in the average investment project di¤ers across industries and is well-suited for our inci-
dence analysis since our goal is to identify the e¤ect of the corporate income tax on wages
through its impact on factor reallocation across industries. Another advantage of the ef-
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fective marginal tax rate is that unobserved shocks to individual wages are unlikely to be
correlated with the industry-level characteristics. Therefore, the industry-level tax and in-
dustry concentration provide plausible exogenous determinants of wages at the individual
level.
4.1 Sample Selection Issues
Approximately one quarter of the observations in our sample (described below in section
4.2) have missing wages because the individual did not work, presenting a typical sample
selection problem. The working sample is nonrandomly chosen, and the unobserved factors
that determine the wage are likely to be correlated with the unobservables that inuence
ones decision to work. It is well known that a simple OLS regression on the working sample
would yield biased and inconsistent estimates.7 To correct for the sample selection bias,
we add a rst-stage selection equation, in which the probability of being employed (empli)
depends on ones nonwork income (inci), education (educi), age, marital status (marriedi),
number of children younger than 5 (child5i), number of children between age 6 and 19
(child20i), and white noise (ui):
empli =
8><>: 1 if 1inci + 2educi + 3agei + 4child5i + 5child20i + 6marriedi + ui > 0;0 if 1inci + 2educi + 3agei + 4child5i + 5child20i + 6marriedi + ui  0:
The exclusion restriction is that nonwork income should a¤ect ones decision to work but
should not impact the marginal utility from work. We measure nonwork income by aggre-
gating net income received in the form of rents, dividends, interest, private transfers, and
alimony payments. We model married women as the secondary earner of the household and
include the husbands wage and salary in their nonwork income.
7See Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) for an excellent survey on wage estimation with correction for
sample selection bias.
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4.2 Data
E¤ective tax rates. We use the e¤ective marginal tax rate to capture the e¤ect of tax policy
on investment. As is well-known, the marginal e¤ective tax rate is the percentage di¤erence
between the pre-tax and after-tax rate of return on a marginal investment project. This rate
summarizes all modeled tax provisions (the statutory tax rate, present value of depreciation
allowances, and investment credits) that apply to an incremental dollar of capital investment
in a hypothetical project.
We calculate the e¤ective marginal corporate tax rate for each industry by taking a
weighted average of the e¤ective marginal tax rates on all of the assets used in the industry.
We obtain asset level e¤ective tax rates (ETRat) from Fullerton and Henderson (1985) and
Mackie (2002). Both papers follow the Hall-and-Jorgenson cost-of-capital approach and
compute the e¤ective marginal corporate tax rates for 34 types of investment in equipment
and nonresidential structures. Cross-time variation in e¤ective tax rates comes from two
sources: changes in the tax system due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and changes
in macroeconomic conditions reected in the real interest and ination rates.8 The tax rates
in Fullerton and Henderson (1985) are calculated for 1982 while those in Mackie (2002) are
calculated for 1992 and 1997. Both before and after TRA86, there is variation in e¤ective
tax rates across assets as a result of di¤erences in depreciation schedules. Before TRA86
there is additional variation across asset types due to the presence of the investment tax
credit for equipment.
We use the capital ow tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S.
Commerce Department to construct asset-specic weights for our industry-level marginal
e¤ective tax rates. The capital ow tables are published in the Survey of Current Business
and are available approximately every ve years. We use information for 1982, 1992 and
1997 since we have calculated marginal e¤ective tax rates for assets only for these years.
The tables provide information on new capital investment in equipment and structures by
industry. We compute the weight for each asset a in industry j in year t (Wajt) as the value
of new investment relative to total industry new investment.9 The year-specic industry
8After TRA86, there was only one major change to the corporate tax in our sample period. The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 added a new fourth bracket to the corporate tax at 35 percent.
9We e¤ectively assume that the distribution of new capital across assets is equal to the existing distribution
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ETR is calculated as10
ETRjt =
34X
a=1
ETRatWajt:
Industry concentration ratios. We use Economic Census data on industry revenue to
calculate concentration ratios for each industry. The market concentration ratio is the total
revenue of the four largest rms relative to total industry revenue.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the industry marginal e¤ective tax rates and
concentration ratios. There is substantial variation in both variables across industries and
time. The mean e¤ective tax rate increased from about 20% in 1982 to 32% in 1992 and
1997. Meanwhile, the average market concentration ratio decreased from about 33% in 1982
to approximately 24% in the 1990s.
Individual characteristics. Our individual-level data is from IPUMS-CPS, an integrated
dataset of the randomly-sampled March Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS data
provide individual-level information on wages and industry a¢ liation. We restrict our sample
to full-time private sector workers between ages 17 and 65, and exclude students and those
working in the armed forces. The nal sample contains 287,111 individuals.
Table 2 reports information on the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the
sample. We impute years of schooling from nine categories of educational attainment.11 We
compute work experience (Exper) as the di¤erence between age and the years of schooling
minus six (Experi = agei   si   6). Socioeconomic characteristics include annual nonwork
income, an indicator for being married, age, number of children younger than 5 years old,
and number of children between the ages of 6 and 20. Table 2 also reports average weekly
wages for workers. As discussed in section 4.1, we model the decision to work as a function
of the socioeconomic variables. The wage process is determined by the individual charac-
teristics described above (with the exclusion of nonwork income), as well as the industry
of capital across assets. This gives us an average marginal e¤ective tax rate for each industry.
10The e¤ective tax rate calculation for each industry parallels that of Gruber and Rauh (2007) and Dwenger
and Steiner (2008).
11We impute the number of years of schooling, si, from the following categorical scheme of educational
attainment: 1 =None or preschool(0 years); 2 =1-4 grades(2.5 years); 3 =5-8(6.5 years); 4 =9(9
years); 5 =10(10 years); 6 =11(11 years); 7 =12(12 years); 8 = 1-3 years of college(14 years); 9 =
4+ years of college(16 years). Education is measured as the highest level reported in CPS.
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characteristics including the e¤ective marginal corporate tax rate, concentration ratio, and
the interaction term between the tax rate and concentration ratio.
Industry Comparability: NAICS, SIC and Census Code. We use data from three major
sources: the BEA Capital Flow tables, the Economic Census, and the IPUMS-CPS. Each
uses a di¤erent industry classication system and these systems changed over the sample
period. As a result, we needed to develop a unied industry classication. The detailed
matching procedure is described in the appendix. Table A1 provides descriptions of the 41
matching industries. While this industry classication is not as rened as the BEAs 3-digit
SICs, it contains more industries than typically used in the e¤ective tax rate literature. (see,
for example, Gravelle (1994), Mackie (2002) and Gruber and Rauh (2007))
5 Empirical Results and Discussion
5.1 Individual-level Evidence
Table 3 reports the estimated e¤ects of e¤ective marginal tax rates and concentration ratios
on the weekly wage. Table 4 summarizes the estimation results from the rst-stage selection
equation. We use the same rst-stage Probit selection model for all specications. At the
second stage, we regress wages on the e¤ective marginal corporate tax rates and concentration
ratios, controlling for individual characteristics (years of education, experience, experience-
squared, number of children younger than 5, number of children between 6 and 20, marital
status, and region dummies). We estimate the wage equation with year and industry xed
e¤ects to account for unobserved industry heterogeneity. The estimated tax coe¢ cient in
column 1 is negative and statistically di¤erent from zero. Wages are higher for workers in
industries with lower e¤ective marginal tax rates.
The remaining columns of Table 3 take imperfect competition into account. As shown in
column 2, the magnitude of the estimated tax coe¢ cient decreases slightly once we control
for industry concentration (although the di¤erence between the tax coe¢ cients in columns
1 and 2 is statistically insignicant). Columns 3 and 4 present estimates of the full model
including the interaction between the tax rate and concentration ratio from the two-stage
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Heckman regression and maximum likelihood estimation. The coe¢ cient of the interaction
term is negative and highly signicant. Combining the coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction
term with the negative tax coe¢ cient suggests that the elasticity of wage with respect to
the tax rate increases with the industry concentration level. This result suggests that for
a uniform increase in the e¤ective tax rates in U.S. economy, workers in the concentrated
industries bear a larger share of the corporate tax burden.
5.2 Industry-level Evidence
Researchers have documented a wide dispersion in wages across industries for workers with
similar socioeconomic characteristics. These industry wage premiums are highly persistent
over time (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Dickens and Katz, 1987a,b), and there is no evi-
dence of arbitrage activities in employment movement (Dickie and Gerking, 1998; Helwege,
1992). These ndings suggest that labor market conditions may vary at the industry level
in equilibrium, generating industry-specic market-clearing wage rates. If this is the case,
the relevant observation for the incidence analysis will be the industry wage rate and our
individual-level data will overstate the true number of degrees of freedom.
In this section we repeat our analysis at the industry level by constructing a pseudo-
panel of average wage rates and worker characteristics.12 We run a xed-e¤ect regression
with the pseudo-panel and report the estimation results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.
Both the estimated tax coe¢ cient and the interaction term remain negative and statistically
signicant. The magnitude of these coe¢ cients are similar to the individual-level estimates.13
The regression in column 2 includes additional industry xed e¤ects and yields a smaller
tax coe¢ cient than that in column 1. It is important to control for unobserved industry
heterogeneity in this setting because part of the variation in the tax rates comes from the
di¤erent asset mix across industries. But the choice of asset mix does not only respond to
tax incentives; it can also be determined by the unobserved industry-specic factors (Liu,
2011). If the unobserved industry heterogeneity is correlated with the e¤ective marginal tax
12By averaging across workers in an industry, we assume that the average worker is the relevant observation.
13Several individual characteristic estimates including the education coe¢ cient lose their signicance in
the industry-level regression due to the limited variation in averages of individual characteristics across
industries.
13
rates, estimates of the tax coe¢ cient would be biased and inconsistent.
To address the potential aggregation bias from using industry averages, we run a two-
step regression where we regress the individual wage against all individual socioeconomic
characteristics with correction for sample selection bias. We then regress the industry-level
residuals on tax rates, the concentration ratio, and the interaction term:
ln residjt = + 1 lnTjt + 2 lnCRjt + 3 lnTjt  lnCRjt + cj + t + "jt;
where residjt is the industry average of residuals b"ijt from the rst-step wage regression:
lnwijt = + Xijt + "ijt:
The estimation results are summarized in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. The second-stage
estimates of the tax rate and the interaction term are negative and statistically signicant
once we control for unobserved industry heterogeneity. The magnitude of the estimates is
smaller than those from the industry-average regression but conrm our results that the
elasticity of wage with respect to the tax rates decreases with industry competitiveness.
5.3 Testing the Endogeneity of Concentration Ratio
We use the concentration ratio to measure industry competitiveness, which in turn may
be a¤ected by the previous decisions and prots of rms in the industry. For example, in
searching for higher prots, incumbent rms can strategically increase the entry barrier and
limit the number of rms in an industry. If part of the wage payment comes from economic
rents and hence correlates with the concentration level, the coe¢ cient on the OLS estimate
of concentration ratio will be biased. The coe¢ cient on the OLS estimate of the interaction
between concentration ratio and the tax rate will also be biased. We therefore should test
for the endogeneity of industry competitiveness using variables that are exogenous to the
wage determination process.
Intensive advertising as well as research and development (R&D) can result in higher
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industry entry barriers. Following Symeonidis (2008), we derive two dummy variables based
on advertising and R&D intensity. We extract data from the Annual Compustat North
America Industrial Files and use advertising and R&D expense relative to industry sales
to measure advertising and R&D intensities. We construct a dummy variable ADV which
equals 0 for industries with advertising-sales ratio lower than 2 percent and 1 otherwise. The
dummy variable RD is constructed in a similar fashion. It equals 0 for industries with R&D-
sales ratios lower than 2 percent and 1 otherwise. While the levels of advertising and R&D
intensities are endogenous, whether they are above or below the 2 percent cuto¤ point is
determined by exogenous industry characteristics (Symeonidis, 2008). For industries below
the cuto¤ point, either advertising or R&D is not an important strategic variable. Most
industries stay consistently either below or above the 2 percent level across all of the years
in the sample period.
The natural market size can also a¤ect the industry concentration level due to the nature
of products and associated transportation costs. Some industries such as perishable food or
beverage production are geographically less mobile due to transportation costs and therefore
conned to a smaller market size than footloose industries. We estimate the annual industry-
level transportation costs following Ederington, Levinson and Minier (2005). Specically, we
regress transportation costs on a vector of industry dummies for each sample year, controlling
for distance and distance squared for the 15 largest exporting partners of the United States.
We use the industry xed-e¤ects coe¢ cient as the measure of transportation costs. Since the
transportation cost data is only available for the non-service industries, we include a dummy
(TMISS) taking on a value of 1 if no information on the transportation cost is available.14
We perform the regression-based Durbin-Wu-Hausman test by regressing the concentra-
tion ratio on the e¤ective tax rates, the advertising and R&D dummies, and transportation
costs:
lnCRjt = + 11ADVjt + 21RDjt + 31TRANSjt + 41TMISSjt + cj + t + 1ijt: (2)
14The xed-e¤ects coe¢ cient is set to zero for industries with no information on transport cost. Both the
industry xed-e¤ects coe¢ cient and the dummy denoting a missing value for the transport cost are included
in the regression.
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We interact the tax rate with the tted value of the concentration ratio \lnCRjt from equation
(2) to instrument the endogenous interaction term (Wooldridge, 2008, p. 118-120 and 235-
237):
lnETRjt  lnCRjt = + 12ADVjt + 22RDjt + 32TRANSjt + 42TMISSjt
+5 lnETRjt  \lnCRjt + cj + t + 2ijt: (3)
Under the maintained assumption that all the explanatory variables in equation (2) and (3)
are exogenous, the structural error "ijt in equation (1) should not be correlated with the
reduced form error 1ijt and 2ijt.15 To test this hypothesis, we run an augmented industry-
level two-step regression with b1ijt and b2ijt as additional regressors and jointly test whether
the two coe¢ cients on the residuals equal zero. The resulting large p-value (0:50) indicates
that we cannot reject exogeneity of either the concentration ratio or the interaction term.16
5.4 Labor Share of the Corporate Income Tax
The marginal e¤ect of changes in the e¤ective marginal corporate tax on wages varies across
the distribution of the concentration ratio. At any given concentration level, the elasticity
of wage with respect to the corporate tax rate is
@ lnwjt
@ lnTjt
= 1 + 3 lnCRjt:
Table 6 summarizes the wage elasticity at di¤erent quartiles of concentration ratio using
both the individual-level and industry-level estimates. Overall, accounting for the e¤ect of
concentration ratio, the average elasticity of wages with respect to the marginal e¤ective cor-
porate tax rate is  0:028 using the individual-level estimates from column (3) of table 4 and
 0:038 using the industry-level estimates from column (2) and (4) of table 5. Computed at
15This method is equivalent to regressing the interaction term on the exogenous variables as well as a long
list of additional nonlinear functions of the exogenous variables.
16Results of the DWH test are robust to alternate cuto¤ points including 1:5% and 3% for the advertising
and R&D intensities.
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di¤erent quartiles of concentration ratio, the wage elasticity increases with the concentration
ratio. For the least concentrated industries, the positive wage elasticity suggests that the
corporate tax does not lower wages. The wage elasticity at the fourth quartile is at least four
times larger than the elasticity at the second quartile, suggesting more shifting of corporate
income taxes in the more concentrated industries.
To assess the incidence of corporate income tax, we calculate the impact of a one dollar
increase in corporate tax liabilities on total wages. In 1997 (the last year of our sample),
total U.S. corporate income tax revenue was $182:29 billion. A ten percentage increase of
the e¤ective marginal rate would raise the corporate tax revenue by $18:23 billion providing
the tax base remains constant. Total U.S. wages and salaries in 1997 were $3; 874 billion.17
Assuming no adjustment in total employment, a 0:28 percent drop in the wage rate (our
column 1 estimate from Table 6) would decrease total compensation by $10:96 billion. Hence,
the burden borne by labor of a one dollar increase in corporate tax liability is around $0:60.
The 95 percent condence interval for the average elasticity suggests that the labor share of
the tax burden lies between 59 and 61 percent of corporate tax revenue.
Labors share of the corporate tax burden is approximately 80 percent of corporate tax
revenue if we use the industry-level estimates. For every dollar increase in the corporate tax
revenue, the associated 95 percent condence interval for the decrease in wage rate is between
$0:42 and $1:19 using the industry-average estimates and between $0:62 and $1:00 using the
two-step estimates. These estimates suggest that labor bears a substantial share of the tax
burden. If capital and labor equally bear the burden of the tax, the share of the burden that
labor bears will be in proportion to its share of income, which is around two-thirds in the
United States. This rule-of-thumb estimate is close to our most conservative labor share of
tax burden imputed from individual-level results, suggesting that labor possibly bears more
of the corporate tax burden than its share of income.
17Annual wage estimates from National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates published by
Bureau of Labor Statstics.
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6 Conclusion
We measure the responsiveness of wages to changes in corporate income taxes. We use
variation in industry-level tax changes to identify the impact of corporate income taxes on
wage rates within the United States, allowing di¤erences in industry concentration to a¤ect
the incidence analysis. We nd that corporate marginal e¤ective taxes rates have a negative
e¤ect on workerswages. In addition, our results suggest that the shifting of corporate taxes
to wages intensies with the degree of industry concentration.
Our ndings suggest that labor shares a signicant part of the burden of corporate income
taxes. A direct calculation of the mean marginal e¤ect of the corporate income tax from our
estimates suggests that a ten percentage increase in the tax rate would decrease the average
wage rate by 0:28   0:38 percent. Labor shares at least 42 percent of the burden of the
corporate tax and possibly more. The average labor share of the corporate tax burden is
around 60  80 percent.
One important caveat is that, due to the limitation of our data structure, we are unable
to study the dynamic e¤ects of corporate tax rates. While the theory of the tax incidence
suggests that changes of factor input occur instantaneously with changes in the tax rates, it
is likely that the adjustment process plays out over many periods and therefore, the short-run
incidence may di¤er from the long-run incidence of the corporate taxes. In future research
we plan to investigate the dynamics of corporate tax shifting.
In line with other empirical work on the incidence of corporate income tax, we focus
on the e¤ect of corporate tax rates on wage rates. A more complete analysis would also
investigate the e¤ect of the tax on employment. Distinguishing between the quantity and
price e¤ects of corporate taxes remains an important topic for further research.
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A Theory
In this section we rst summarize the Davidson and Martin (1985) (DM) model of the
incidence of the corporate income tax under imperfect competition and then derive a com-
parative static result that describes how the degree of imperfect competition a¤ects the
incidence of the corporate income tax. The comparative static result presented in the last
section suggests that the wage elasticity with respect to the corporate tax is an increasing
function of the industry concentration level.
A.1 Partial Equilibrium in the Corporate Sector
Suppose that there are I industries in the economy. Each industry has a corporate
(imperfectly competitive) sector and a noncorporate (competitive) sector. The corporate
sector has N rms. The corporate group plays a repeated game in which each rm produces
constrained quantities of a single good X under constant cost. Constrained production
maximizes the joint prot in the corporate sector subject to no cheating. If any rm cheats
by producing a higher quantity at time t, every rm will revert permanently to the Nash
output level. Each rm compares the current gain from cheating to the present value of
prot loss by permanently producing at a lower output level. The net gains from cheating
(Z) are
Z = (ch   c)  1
r
(c   n) (4)
where ch denotes the prot from cheating, c the prot per rm under constrained produc-
tion, n the prot per rm in the static Nash equilibrium, and r the price of capital, i.e. the
interest rate.
LetQc denote the constrained production quantity per rm. The corporate sector chooses
Qc from the set of sustainable outputs dened as Q  fQc : Z  0; Qc  0g. The prot of
the corporate group is:
c = Qc[P (Xc; !)  c] (5)
where P (; !) is the inverse demand function for good X,18 c the constant unit cost of
18P (; !) is assumed to be single peaked and twice di¤erentiable to guarantee a well-dened maximization
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production and ! is a vector of shift parameters. The static Nash prot is:
n = max
Qn
Qn

P [(N   1)Q+Qn; !]  c
	
(6)
for which DM assume the existence of a symmetric solution. Lastly, the prot from cheating
is:
ch = max
Qch
Qch fP [(N   1)Qc +Qch; !]  cg (7)
Focusing on the special case in which the representative consumer has a utility function
of the form:
U(X; Y ) = (1  ) lnY +  lnX;
the inverse demand curve for X is:
Px =
M
X
; (8)
where M is the total income, and  is the budget share of good X.
Substituting equation (8) into prot functions (6) and (7), DM solve for n and ch.
Further substituting n; ch and c into equation (4) and setting Z(Qc) = 0; DM solve for
Qc:
Qc =
M(N   1)(rN   1)2
cN2(rN + 1)2
(9)
The inverse demand curve for X now becomes
Px =
N(rN + 1)2
(N   1)(rN   1)2 c: (10)
In general, the inverse demand function under cooperation is a function of the basic
parameters in the model:
Px = Px(!; c; r) (11)
In the perfect competition case, r represents the net return to capital and a¤ects the output
price by increasing the cost of production c: Under imperfect competition, r enters (11) as
problem.
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a separate argument. This separate e¤ect captures the impact of the price of capital on the
pricing decision of the corporate group. Specically,
dPx
dr
=
@Px
@c

@c
@r

+
@Px
@r
(12)
The rst term in (12) is positive since an increase in r increases the cost of capital. The
second term in (12) is negative since an increase in r represents a greater inducement to
increase output, which leads to a lower price. It captures the additional e¤ect of r on prices
under imperfect competition. The overall impact of r on the price depends on the relative
magnitude of these two e¤ects.
A.2 The Corporate Sector in General Equilibrium
Now consider the corporate sector as part of the standard two-sector general equilibrium
model. There are two goods in each industry, X and Y: Perfect competition prevails in the
Y sector, while the behavior of rms in the corporate sector (X) is characterized as above.
Both sectors employ capital (K) and labor (L) both of which are fully mobile between sectors.
All rms are price takers in the capital market.
Following standard notation, qj is the gross-of-tax output price of good j, cj the unit cost
function for good j; w and r the net returns to labor and capital, respectively, Tj one plus
the ad valorem output tax on good j, Tij one plus the partial factor tax on input i used in
the production of good j, and M the aggregate income.
Assuming Z(Qc) > 0; the gross price in the corporate sector is given by
qx = qx(qy;M; cxTx; r): (13)
Assuming perfect competition in the Y sector, the price of Y equals the marginal cost of
production:
qy = cy(wTLy; rTKy)Ty: (14)
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Aggregate demands for the two products are
X = X(qx; qy;M); (15)
Y = Y (qx; qy;M); (16)
and all income is spent in equilibrium
M = qxX + qyY: (17)
We also assume xed supplies of labor (L0) and capital (K0) and full employment:
cLxX + cLyY = L0 (18)
cKxX + cKyY = K0 (19)
where cij are the partial derivatives of the jth unit cost function with respect to the ith
factor and represent the ith input requirement per unit of output of the jth good.
For simplicity, DM choose w as the numeraire and drop equation (15) from the system,
leaving six equations in six unknowns. Substituting the behavior of the corporate sector
characterized by equation (10) into (13) yields
qx =
N(rN + 1)2
(N   1)(rN   1)2 cxTx (20)
Finally, di¤erentiating (14) and (20) we get
bqx   bqy =  ( +	)br + (bTx   bTy) + Kx bTKx   Ky bTKy; (21)
where the circumex denotes proportional change,  = Lx   Kx measures the value of
factor intensity, and Lj  wcLjTj=cj measures labors share in industry j. The second term
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	  4rN=[(rN)2  1] captures the e¤ect of change in r on the ability of the corporate sector
to enforce its output restriction.
Di¤erentiating and di¤erencing the demand (15)-(16) and full-employment conditions
(18)-(19) yields
bX   bY =  (bqx   bqy) (22)
( bX   bY ) =  (axx + ayy)br   axx bTx   ayy bTy; (23)
where j > 0 the elasticity of substitution between K and L in the production of the jth
good with respect to a change in relative rental prices,   Lx   Kx where ij  cij=i0
measures the share of factor i in industry j, and aj  KjLj + LjKj > 0:
Equations (21)-(23) constitute a three-equation general equilibrium model with three
unknowns: bX   bY ; bqx   bqy; and br. We now consider the incidence of a capital tax TKx in
the corporate sector.
A tax on capital in the corporate sector TKx decreases the net return of capital r. Note
that r has two e¤ects on the oligopolistic sector: it allocates the xed supply of capital
between industries and measures time preference. In the latter role, the level of r determines
the present value of prot loss due to cheating. A fall in r reduces the inducement to cheat,
and allows the cartel to sustain a lower output and higher price.
In particular, by setting bTx = bTy = bTKy = 0 in (21)-(23) and solving for the elasticities
of relative outputs, prices, and factor returns, the impact of a corporate income tax is
characterized by the following system of equations:
brD = (Kx   axx)bTKx (24)
( bX   bY )D =  (Kyaxx + Kxayy + axx	)bTKx (25)
(bqx   bqy)D = (Kyaxx + Kxayy + axx	)bTKx; (26)
where D  axx + ayy + ( + 	) and is positive for stability.19 As in the standard
19See Davidson and Martin (1985) for a detailed discussion of the stability properties.
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model of tax incidence, the corporate tax TKx induces an output e¤ect Kx
and a factor
substitution e¤ect axx in the right-hand side of equation (24). Recall that 
 = Lx   Kx
measures the relative factor intensity in the corporate sector. If the corporate sector is labor
intensive, i.e.  > 0, the output e¤ect will increase r/w. On the other hand, the factor
substitution e¤ect will unambiguously decrease r/w. The e¤ect of imperfect competition,
	, a¤ects D in the same direction as the sign of the measure of physical factor intensity,
. If the corporate sector is labor intensive, imperfect competition leads to a larger D and
consequently a smaller elasticity.
A.3 Comparative Statics with Imperfect Competition
We are particularly interested in how the tax e¤ect on wages varies with industry concentra-
tion. To explore this question we derive the rst-order condition of factor prices with respect
to the number of rms in the corporate sector. Writing out equation (24) explicitly, we have
br
w
=
(Kx
   axx)
axx + ayy + 
( +	)
bTKx: (27)
Since percentage deviations from equilibrium equal the natural log-deviations up to rst
order, we have
lnw   ln r =  (Kx
   axx)
axx + ayy + 
( +	)
lnTKx + c; (28)
where c = lnw   ln r   lnT Kx, the di¤erence in pre-perturbation equilibrium values.20
Rearranging we get
lnw =
 (Kx   axx)
axx + ayy + 
( +	)
lnTKx + ln r + c: (29)
Dene wT the elasticity of wage with respect to the corporate income tax. It depends on
20T Kx = 0 before the introduction of capital tax in the X sector.
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the basic parameters as follows:
wT 
@ lnw
@ lnTKx
=
 (Kx   axx)
axx + ayy + 
( +	)
: (30)
Based on equation (30), we derive two key observations. First, wT is negative if Kx
  
axx > 0, for which a necessary condition is that the corporate sector in the U.S. is labor
intensive. Second, wT depends on the degree of industry competitiveness. Specically,
@wT
@N
=
(Kx
   axx)
[axx + ayy + 
( +	)]2
@	
@N
:
As we know that
@	
@N
=
4r[(rN)2   1]  4rN [2(rN) r]
[(rN)2   1]2 (31)
=
 4r   4r3N2
[(rN)2   1]2 < 0;
the elasticity of wage with respect to corporate tax rate decreases with the number of rms
in the corporate sector if the corporate sector is capital intensive, or alternatively, if the
corporate sector is labor intensive and the output e¤ect dominates the factor substitution
e¤ect. For a given positive di¤erence between the output and substitution e¤ect, a small
number of rms implies a large share of joint prot for each rm, and alternatively, a smaller
gain from cheating. In this case, the tax-induced change in the return to capital would imply
a large prot loss from diverting to a higher output level in present value. Consequently, the
additional e¤ect of corporate tax due to imperfect competition works in the same direction as
the output e¤ect, and has the strongest impact on wages in the least competitive industries.21
21As a special case, @	=@N ! 0 as N !1. The wage elasticity converges to the standard prediction in
a two-sector GE model.
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B Derivation of A Consistent Industry Classication
We collect data from three major sources: the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Capital
Flows for the calculation of e¤ective tax rates, the Economic Census for the calculation
of concentration ratio, and the IPUMS-CPS for individual-level information. Each data
source uses a di¤erent industry classication system. The BEAs industry groups are based
on the Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) system. The Census uses SICs for market
concentration data, and the IPUMS-CPS uses the Census Industrial Classication (CIC)
system. Each classication also changes over time. The SIC system was entirely replaced by
NAICS in year 1997. To overcome the problems due to inconsistency among classication
systems, we develop a unied industry classication for the period of analysis.
B.1 The Unied Industry Classication
The rst step in creating a unied industry series is to create the baseline industry categories.
This baseline classication is constrained by the most aggregated classication system in the
data sources, the industry groups in the 1992 BEA capital ow table. Following the industry
classication of the 1992 national input-output accounts, the 1992 BEA capital ow table
groups industries into 64 categories based on the 1987 SICs. Most grouping are based on
the 2-digit SICs, while some are based on the 3-digit level.
We further rene this baseline classication due to cross-time matching constraint. Using
a concordance between the 72 and 87 SICs, we wanted to assign the 80 industries in 1982 into
the 64 groups as in the 1992 BEA data. However, while most industries are grouped at a more
detailed 72 SIC level, a few are grouped at a more aggregated than their 82 counterparts22.
These few exceptions require us to further aggregate industries to 41 categories based on the
2-digit 1987 SICs 23.
22For example, information is only availabe for transportation and warehousing in 1972, while in 1982
detailed information are available for each of the subcategories including railroad transportation (40,474),
local and interurban passenger transportation (41), trucking and warehousing (42), water transportation
(44), transportation by air (45), pipeline, except natural gas (46), transporation services (472,473,478).
23With the excpetion that the Transportation Equipment class is based on the 3-digit SICs.
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B.2 Match with SICs and NAICS
The second step is to match 72 SICs and 97 NAICs to the unied classication. For the rst
match, the 1987 Standard Industrial Classication manual provides a 4-digit code crosswalk
between the 1972 and 1977 SICs and between the 1977 and 1987 SICs. Based on this cor-
respondence, all the changes from 1972 to 1987 SIC industries are within the 41 categories.
There are no crossover changes. The 72 SICs are directly mapped 87 SICs and the unied
industry classes. For the match between 97 NAICS and 87 SICs, we use a crosswalk pro-
vided by the Census which links each 4-digit NAICS to their corresponding 4-digit 87 SICs.
Although a 4-digit 1987 SIC can be assigned to multiple NAICS, this problem is minimized
at 2-digit level, i.e. grouping NAICS by their 2-digit SICs. This is another advantage of our
2-digit SIC based classication system.
B.3 Match with CICs
For this match, we rely on the censusclassied index of industries and occupations, which
provides a crosswalk between the title of each industry and its 3-digit SICs. We assign each
CIC a unied industry number by further aggregating the 3-digit SICs at 2-digit level. The
1970 CICs are based on 1967 SICs and the 1990 CICs are based on 1987 SICs. We check
group comparability across time using a crosswalk provided by the 1972 and the 1987 SIC
manual. All the changes from 1967 to 1987 SIC industries are within the 41 categories.
There are no crossover changes.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: ETR and Concentration Ratio
Mean SD Min Max N
ETR
Overall 28.38 7.76 5.93 40.25 122
Across year 3.67 15.01 37.17
Across industry 6.87 12.63 44.54
CR
Overall 26.51 18.4 1.88 91.8 96
Across year 17.56 3.95 88.19
Across industry 5.33 12.21 39.24
By Year
ETR 82 20.19 5.82 10.72(18) 33.40(36) 40
ETR 92 32.49 4.78 7.92(35) 38.67(38) 41
ETR 97 32.26 5.12 5.93(35) 40.26(36) 41
CR 82 32.75 18.96 5.1(33) 91.8(9) 28
CR 92 23.49 19.17 1.88(36) 89.88(9) 34
CR 97 24.38 16.29 5.67(35) 82.88(9) 34
ETR is the e¤ective marginal tax rate and CR is the four-rm concentration
ratio. Associated industry code in parentheses. For 1982, ETR is missing
for "Motion Picture" industry (39). For all years, CR is missing for the fol-
lowing industries: Agriculture(1), Forestry and Fishing (2), Mining (4)-(6),
Construction (7); Additional CR is missing in 1982 for Transportation (29),
Communication (30), Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services (31), Finance and
Insurance (34), Real Estate (35), and Health, Educational and Social Services
(41).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev
Age 37.87 13.45
No. Children of 0-5 years 0.21 0.52
No. Children of 5-17 years 0.74 1.10
Married 0.60 0.49
Labor market variables
Employment 0.67 0.76
Unemployment 0.07 0.08
Not in labor force 0.26 0.16
Weeks worked 35.79 21.49
Wage and salary income 15165 21569
Log weekly earnings (positive values) 5.55 0.91
Nonwork income (positive values) 9.95 21.13
Education variables
Imputed years of schooling 12.53 2.87
Years of college (4+) 18.68 20.75
Years of college (1-3) 22.44 21.75
12th grade 36.43 34.28
11th grade 5.36 5.39
10th grade 5.65 5.71
9th grade 3.80 3.99
5-8th grade 6.02 6.43
1-4th grade 1.15 1.21
Non or preschool 0.47 0.49
Sample size 275,789
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Table 3: Individual-level Regression: Wage Equation Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2-Stage 2-Stage 2-Stage MLE
Ln Tax -0.0724*** -0.0611*** -0.2384*** -0.2183***
(0.0089) (0.0163) (0.0292) (0.0269)
Ln CR 0.0142** -0.1056*** -0.0910***
(0.0069) (0.0178) (0.0164)
Ln Tax * Ln CR -0.1059*** -0.0924***
(0.0145) (0.0133)
Years of Education 0.1544*** 0.1602*** 0.1603*** 0.1226***
(0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0015)
Experience 0.1076*** 0.1094*** 0.1094*** 0.1084***
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Experience Squared -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Education*Experience -0.0031*** -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0031***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 2.3567*** 3.3262*** 2.9714*** 3.7390***
(0.0460) (0.0722) (0.1007) (0.0810)
Other Individual Characteristics Y Y Y Y
Regional Dummies Y Y Y Y
Time and Industry Fixed E¤ects Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 247112 212508 212508 212508
Censored Observations 79661 79661 79661 79661
Note: Additional individual characteristics included in the regression are num-
ber of children younger than 5, number of children between 6 and 20, and
marrital status. Standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** sig-
nicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 4: Individual-level Regression: Employment Equation Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2-Stage 2-Stage 2-Stage MLE
Nonwork Income -0.0066*** -0.0053*** -0.0053*** -0.0041***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Years of Education 0.1202*** 0.1293*** 0.1293*** 0.1137***
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Age -0.0084*** -0.0084*** -0.0084*** -0.0076***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
# of Children Younger than 5 -0.2133*** -0.2220*** -0.2220*** -0.2051***
(0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0057)
# of Children Between 6 and 20 0.0593*** 0.0545*** 0.0545*** 0.0508***
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Married 0.2386*** 0.1998*** 0.1998*** 0.1751***
(0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0068)
Constant -0.8016*** -1.0347*** -1.0347*** -0.8956***
(0.0145) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0146)
Number of Observations 247112 212508 212508 212508
Note: The regression model is:
empli =

1 if 1nwinci + 2educi + 3agei + 4kids5i + 5kids20i + 6mrsti + ui > 0;
0 if 1nwinci + 2educi + 3agei + 4kids5i + 5kids20i + 6mrsti + ui  0:
This is the rst-stage equation which corrects for sample selection bias in the
wage equation. Standard erros in parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signi-
cant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
36
T
ab
le
5:
In
du
st
ry
W
ag
e
E
qu
at
io
n
E
st
im
at
es
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
In
du
st
ry
A
ve
ra
ge
In
du
st
ry
A
ve
ra
ge
In
du
st
ry
T
w
o-
St
ep
In
du
st
ry
T
w
o-
St
ep
L
n
T
ax
-0
.3
49
9*
*
-0
.2
27
7*
**
-0
.2
15
1
-0
.1
32
0*
*
(0
.1
45
8)
(0
.0
73
5)
(0
.2
19
0)
(0
.0
49
8)
L
n
C
R
0.
02
28
-0
.0
95
2*
0.
15
42
-0
.0
60
5
(0
.0
65
6)
(0
.0
54
9)
(0
.0
92
8)
(0
.0
39
4)
L
n
T
ax
*
L
n
C
R
-0
.1
02
5*
*
-0
.1
21
4*
**
-0
.0
37
0
-0
.0
60
0*
(0
.0
46
8)
(0
.0
44
9)
(0
.0
69
8)
(0
.0
30
1)
C
on
st
an
t
3.
22
65
**
*
-1
.7
16
6
-0
.3
79
5
-0
.4
65
3*
**
(1
.0
47
6)
(3
.2
31
9)
(0
.3
35
2)
(0
.0
68
4)
In
di
vi
du
al
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
Y
Y
Y
Y
R
eg
io
na
l
D
um
m
ie
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
T
im
e
F
ix
ed
E
¤e
ct
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
In
du
st
ry
F
ix
ed
E
¤e
ct
s
N
Y
N
Y
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
95
95
95
95
N
ot
e:
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
m
od
el
in
C
ol
um
n
1
is
:
ln
w
jt
=

+

X
jt
+

1
ln
T
jt
+

2
ln
C
R
jt
+

3
ln
T
jt

ln
C
R
jt
+
c j
+

t
+
" j
t:
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
m
od
el
in
C
ol
um
n
2
is
:
ln
re
si
d
jt
=

+

1
ln
T
jt
+

2
ln
C
R
jt
+

3
ln
T
jt

ln
C
R
jt
+
c j
+

t
+
" j
t;
w
he
re
re
si
d
jt
is
ob
ta
in
ed
fr
om
th
e
r
st
-s
te
p
re
gr
es
si
on
ln
w
ij
t
=

+

X
ij
t
+
" i
jt
:
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*
si
gn
i
ca
nt
at
0.
10
le
ve
l,
**
si
gn
i
ca
nt
at
0.
05
le
ve
l,
**
*
si
gn
i
ca
nt
at
0.
01
le
ve
l.
37
Table 6: Marginal E¤ects of ETR across the Distribution of CR (%)
(1) (2) (3)
Individual-Level Industry Average Industry Two-Step
Mean Marginal E¤ect -0.0283*** -0.0379*** -0.0382***
(0.0002) (0.0091) (0.0045)
ME at CR Quartile 1 0.0542*** 0.0736*** 0.0169***
(0.0002) (0.0135) (0.0066)
ME at CR Quartile 2 -0.0167*** -0.0158*** -0.0273***
(0.0001) (0.0032) (0.0016)
ME at CR Quartile 3 -0.0481*** -0.0731*** -0.0556***
(0.0001) (0.0033) (0.0016)
ME at CR Quartile 4 -0.1226*** -0.1400*** -0.0886***
(0.0002) (0.0080) (0.0039)
Observations 158925 96 96
Note: The wage elasticity is determined by calculating the marginal e¤ect of
ETR, increasing the tax rate by one percent, and recomputing the marginal
e¤ect. The wage elasticity is the resulting change in the marginal e¤ects.
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Table A1: A Unied Industry Classication System
UIC Industry Description Related 87SIC
1 Agricultural Production 01,02
2 Agricultural Services, Forestry, and Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 07,08,09
3 Metal Mining 10
4 Coal Mining 12
5 Oil and Gas Extraction 13
6 Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 14
7 Construction 15,16,17
8 Food and Kindred Products 20
9 Tobacco Products 21
10 Textile Mill Products 22
11 Apparel and Other Finished Products 23
12 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 24
13 Furniture and Fixtures 25
14 Paper and Allied Products 26
15 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 27
16 Chemicals and Allied Products 28
17 Petroleum Rening and Related Industries 29
18 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 30
19 Leather and Leather Products 31
20 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 32
21 Primary Metal Industries 33
22 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation Equipment 34
23 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 35
24 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except Computer 36
25 Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment 371
26 Transportation Equipment, Except Motor Vehicles 372-6,379
27 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling Instruments 38
28 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 39
29 Transportation 40-7
30 Communications 48
31 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 49
32 Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade 50,51,52-7,59
33 Eating and Drinking Places 58
34 Finance and Insurance 60-4,67
35 Real Estate 65
36 Lodging, Personal, and Miscellaneous Repair Services 70,72,76
37 Business, Legal, Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services 73,81,87,89
38 Automotive Repair, Services, and Parking 75
39 Motion Pictures 78
40 Amusement and Recreation Services 79
41 Health, Educational and Social Services, Museums, Galleries and Zoos, Membership Organizations 80,82-84,86
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